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We present an experimental study of higher-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols based
on mutually unbiased bases, implemented by means of photons carrying orbital angular momentum.
We perform (d + 1) mutually unbiased measurements in a classical prepare and measure scheme
and on a pair of entangled photons for dimensions ranging from d = 2 to 5. In our analysis, we pay
attention to the detection efficiency and photon pair creation probability. As security measures, we
determine from experimental data the average error rate, the mutual information shared between the
sender and receiver and the secret key generation rate per photon. We demonstrate that increasing
the dimension leads to an increased information capacity as well as higher key generation rates per
photon up to a dimension of d = 4.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) establishes a secure
key between two parties, Alice and Bob, in which they
can encode a secret message [1–3]. Protocols for QKD are
classified as either prepare and measure (P&M) schemes
or entanglement-based (EB) schemes. Examples of P&M
schemes are BB84 [3], B92 [4], six-state [5] and SARG04
[6]. However, P&M schemes such as the E91 protocol [7]
in general can be translated into EB schemes.
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) [8–10] have found
many applications, for example in quantum state tomog-
raphy [10–13] and quantum error correction codes [14, 15]
and also appear useful in QKD protocols. This is because
projective measurements in one basis provides no knowl-
edge of the state in any of the other bases [3, 16, 17].
Therefore if an eavesdropper measures in the incorrect
basis he/she will obtain no meaningful information but
instead introduce a disturbance in the system, resulting
in its detection. The simplest example of MUBs of di-
mension d = 2 are the horizontal/vertical, diagonal/anti-
diagonal, and left-/right-handed polarization bases as
they are unbiased with respect to each other, forming
a set of three MUBs. Although MUBs offer security
against eavesdropping, encoding states in the polariza-
tion degree of freedom only allows a maximum of one bit
of information transmitted per photon which results in a
limited key generation rate. Since systems with higher-
dimensional Hilbert space can store more information per
carrier, the question arises whether QKD protocols us-
ing higher-dimensional MUBs also result in higher gen-
eration rates of secure key bits; indeed, such protocols
can be expected to be more robust in terms of abstract
noise measures [18, 19]. Their actual performance in
terms of secure key rate however, depends on whether
the amount of noise in higher-dimensional implementa-
tions grows faster with increasing dimension than their
robustness against noise. The present article addresses
this question for implementations using the orbital an-
gular momentum (OAM) of photons. Beams that carry
OAM have an azimuthal angular dependence of exp(iℓθ)
[20] where ℓ is the azimuthal index and θ is the azimuthal
angle. It has been shown theoretically that MUBs for
higher-dimensional OAM states can be used to encode
bits of information in alignment with the BB84 protocol
[21–24]. A standard P&M implementation of a general-
ized BB84 protocol, relying on 11 OAM states and su-
perpositions of these 11 OAM states, has previously been
performed [25], using 2 of the 12 available MUBs.
In this paper we experimentally investigate an
entanglement-based scheme for QKD encoded in com-
plete sets of higher-dimensional MUBs, which we first
verify with a classically simulated P&M scheme. We
implement our protocol with MUBs encoded in OAM
states and present values for the corresponding average
error rates, classical Shannon information and secret key
rates. As with all OAM protocols, our QKD protocol
uses filter measurements that project onto one MUB ele-
ment at a time; we provide the connection between these
protocols to the established theory for protocols using
full MUB measurements. To achieve this, we prove that
the detection efficiency depends only on the basis choice
and not on the elements within a basis, otherwise the
security parameters of the protocol cannot be evaluated.
This allows us to map our protocol to the key rates, thus
arriving at the standard MUB protocol. By increasing
the dimension d, we obtain an increase in the secret key
rate which has been theoretically observed in recent pa-
2pers [18, 19], resulting in higher key generation rates for
dimension d = 4. Similarly the Shannon mutual infor-
mation increases, demonstrating an improvement in the
information capacity.
II. CHOICE OF MUTUALLY UNBIASED BASES
Two orthonormal bases M1 = {|φ(1,i)〉, i =
0, 1, · · · , d−1} andM2 = {|φ(2,j)〉, j = 0, 1, · · · , d−1} of
a d-dimensional Hilbert space Hd are said to be mutually
unbiased if, and only if, all pairs of basis vectors |φ(1,i)〉
and |φ(2,j)〉 satisfy
|〈φ(1,i)|φ(2,j)〉|2 = 1
d
. (1)
Physically, this means that for a system prepared in
the basis M1 and measured with respect to basis M2,
all outcomes are equally probable. This property of mu-
tually unbiased bases makes them important for QKD
protocols.
Mutually unbiased bases were introduced by Schwinger
[8] in 1960 as optimum incompatible measurement bases.
In 1981, Ivonovic showed their application in quantum
state discrimination [9]. Later Wootters and Fields [10]
gave a constructive proof that there exist complete sets
of MUBs for prime power dimensions and proved that
for any dimension d there are not more than d+1 MUBs
within any particular set of MUBs.
The smallest prime dimension is 2, and for that an
example of a complete set of MUBs consists of the eigen-
states of the three Pauli spin operators σz , σx, σy, i.e,
{|0〉, |1〉}; (2){
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) , 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
}
; (3){
1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉) , 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)
}
. (4)
Pauli operators can be generalized to higher dimen-
sion, known as the Weyl operators. These are unitary
operators of the form XkZ l for k, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d −
1}. The operator Z is diagonal in the standard basis
{|0〉, |1〉, · · · , |d− 1〉}:
Z =
d−1∑
i=0
ωi|i〉〈i|, (5)
with ω = exp(i2π/d) whereas, the operator X reads:
X =
d−1∑
i=0
|i+ 1 mod d〉〈i|. (6)
The eigenbases belonging to the different operators in the
set {Z,XZ l|l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}} form a complete set of
MUBs for any prime number d as the dimension of the
underlying Hilbert space. For d = 2, the operator X is
identical with the Pauli operator σx and the operator Z
is given by the Pauli operator σz .
In the present study of MUB based QKD a complete
set of MUBs is implemented following the recipe above
by means of photons carrying OAM. The MUBs are
obtained by assuming that the standard basis (eigen-
basis of the operator Z ) is realized by single-photon
states which correspond to an elementary excitation of
Laguerre-Gauss modes (LGℓ) carrying OAM value l~.
For d = 2 we employ the LGℓ modes with ℓ = ±1 to
generate the standard basis.
For d = 3, our choice of the standard basis corresponds
to LGℓ modes with OAM values ℓ = −1, 0, 1:
| − 1〉 ≡

 10
0

 , |0〉 ≡

 01
0

 , |1〉 ≡

 00
1



 ; (7)
The remaining three bases are given in matrix notation
with respect to the standard basis as:
1√
3

1 1 11 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω

 , 1√
3

1 1 ω1 ω 1
ω 1 1

 , 1√
3

 1 1 ω21 ω2 1
ω2 1 1

 .
(8)
Here each matrix represents a complete orthonormal ba-
sis with its columns reflecting the basis vectors. In gen-
eral, for prime dimension d, the standard basis consists
of d LGℓ modes, while the remaining d bases pertain
to superpositions of the LGℓ modes. Examples of the
LGℓ modes and their superpositions are given in Fig. (1),
which contains images of the measurement holograms
and their corresponding intensity profiles.
FIG. 1. The states for each of the 4 MUBs for d = 3. The
images on the left represent the measurement filters (or holo-
grams) for each of the 12 states. The images in the middle
and on the right contain the corresponding experimentally
produced and theoretically calculated intensity profiles of the
LGℓ modes produced by each hologram.
III. FILTER BASED MUB QKD PROTOCOL
We will now describe how our QKD protocol which is
based on filter measurements operates. In both scenar-
ios, Alice (SLM A) prepares her mode in a state chosen
3randomly from one of the (d+1) bases, while Bob (SLM
B) performs a measurement on his mode by randomly
selecting a state in one of the (d+1) bases chosen out of
d(d + 1) different basis settings but biased towards one
basis. Each party then announces from which basis the
filter measurement was chosen (sifting) and keeps mea-
surements if they all arrived in the same basis. They later
make announcements as to whether photon coincidences
occurred (post-selection). A coincidence event represents
a conclusive result, otherwise it becomes inconclusive.
This is followed by parameter estimation (error rate in
the remaining data), error correction and privacy ampli-
fication. The announcement step allows our filter mea-
surement based QKD protocol to be mapped back to the
original protocol which uses full MUB measurements.
IV. AVERAGE ERROR RATE AND SECRET
KEY RATE
In standard EB QKD protocols both parties perform
measurements on the states that they receive, followed
by a public announcement of their measurement basis.
The two parties then compare a small portion of their
measurements in order to obtain an estimate of the av-
erage error rate. This quantifies the error in the QKD
protocol resulting from all sources of noise, such as noise
in the transmission channel and errors in the measure-
ments. Moreover, the noise could also be caused by an
eavesdropper. The error rate refers to the probability
that Alice sends the state |φ(β,k)〉, while Bob receives an
orthogonal state |φ(β,k′)〉. Given the MUB β, the corre-
sponding average error rate in each basis Qβ , is expressed
as
Qβ =
∑
k,k
k′ 6=k
tr
[
|φ∗(β,k)〉〈φ∗(β,k)| ⊗ |φ(β,k′)〉〈φ(β,k′)|ρAB
]
.
(9)
The total average error rate is the total error obtained as
an average over the different MUBs, L [19] and is defined
as
Q =
1
L
∑
β∈L
Qβ. (10)
We use the full set of available MUBs, therefore L = d+1.
Another important figure of merit for the perfomance
of a QKD scheme is the secret key rate. It is given by
the amount of information that one can send securely in
a photonic QKD scheme. It equals the number of key bits
per photon measured by both parties in the same basis
that can be generated securely. The maximum secret
key rate that one can achieve is log2d for a d level system
but is limited by an adversarial attack by Eve, which
results in an observed error that requires Alice and Bob to
perform error correction and privacy amplification. Both
processes affect the secret key rate. The resulting key
rate is given as [18, 19]
rmin = log2 d+
d+ 1
d
Q log2
(
Q
d(d − 1)
)
+
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
log2
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
, (11)
where Q is the average error rate from Eq. (10).
The secret key rate is given as the difference between
the classical mutual information shared by Alice and Bob
and the information shared by Alice and Eve as measured
by the quantum mutual information. The quantum mu-
tual information is also referred to as the Holevo quantity
[2]. The Holevo quantity measures the information that
one has on Alice’s data as a result of Eve’s interaction
with the signals as they pass to Bob. The secret key rate
can be written as
r = I(A : B)− χ(X : E), (12)
where I(A : B) is the classical mutual information and
χ(X : E) = H(X) − S(E) − S(X,E) is the quantum
mutual information or Holevo quantity where H and S
denote the Shannon entropy and von Neumann entropy
respectively.
The limit on the tolerable error rate that is safe for
secret key generation can be improved by implementing
a full set of (d + 1) MUBs [19, 24]. Using a full set of
MUBs results in an increase in the tolerable error rate in
which we can still extract a reasonable secret key without
compromising the security of the protocol. However, this
happens at the cost of reducing the transmission rate
which is proportional to the probability 1/(d + 1) that
Alice and Bob choose the same basis. But in our protocol,
this is not a problem since we make use of the asymmetric
[26] basis choice, so one does not pay the high cost of
sifting with MUBs. In order to calculate the maximum
tolerable error rate, Qmax, the secret key rate, rmin, is
set to zero.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our EB QKD protocol was implemented at the sin-
gle photon level on entangled photon pairs depicted in
Fig. 2. A collimated 350 mW UV laser (Vanguard 355-
2500) was directed to pump a 3 mm-thick type-I BBO
crystal, producing collinear frequency-degenerate entan-
gled photon pairs at 710 nm. A beam-splitter was used to
separate the collinear signal and idler photons (depicted
by arms A and B) which were directed and imaged (2×)
from the plane of the crystal onto spatial light modula-
tors (SLMs) by a 4-f telescope. The SLMs were used
to execute the filter measurements and were encoded to
manipulate both the phase and amplitude of the incident
light [27–30], allowing only one particular superposition
of the LG modes to be detected by the detector, while all
the others are blocked. False colour images of the types of
filters (or holograms) encoded on the SLMs are presented
4in Fig. 1. The projected mode obtained at the plane of
the SLM, be it either Gaussian or non-Gaussian, depend-
ing on whether the filter either does or does not match
the state of the incident photon, was imaged (0.004×) by
a 4-f telescope onto a single-mode fibre. The fibres were
connected to avalanche photodiodes which detected the
photon pairs via a coincidence counter. The single count
rates, SA and SB, and the coincidence count rates, C,
were recorded simultaneously and accumulated over an
integration time of 10 s.
FIG. 2. The experimental setup used to perform both the
EB and P&M QKD protocols. The plane of the crystal was
relayed imaged onto SLMs A and B with the use of lenses, L1
and L2 (f1 = 200 mm and f2 = 400 mm). Lenses L3 and L4
(f3 = 500 mm and f4 = 2 mm) were used to relay image the
SLM planes to single-mode fibres.
An initial step in conducting our EB QKD protocol,
was to test it classically in a P&M based scheme. Our ex-
perimental setup for the P&M scheme can be illustrated
with the use of Fig. 2 where the BBO crystal is consid-
ered to be reflective and the APD in Arm A is replaced
with a laser source and the APD in Arm B with a CCD
camera. This procedure is commonly referred to as back-
projection or retrodiction [31]. Conducting the protocol
in this manner, provided a quicker and simpler method
for the verification of the experimental procedure.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
By way of example we consider d = 3 in our P&M
based protocol. We scanned through all possible states,
defined by Eqs (7) and (8) and depicted in Fig. 1, on
SLM A and SLM B. Figure 3 (a) contains the cross-
sectional intensity profiles recorded on the CCD (de-
picted in Fig. 2) when SLM A and SLM B scanned
through the states pertaining to the first basis. It is
evident that when SLM A and SLM B select the same
(different) states, a Gaussian mode (singularity) appears
on axis. The normalized on-axis intensities are depicted
in Fig. 3 (b) for the permutation of all the bases elements
for d = 3. We note that the diagonal elements are equal
FIG. 3. (a) Cross-sectional intensity profiles of the field
recorded on the CCD for permutations of the first basis’s
states encoded on SLM A and SLM B. White cross-hairs
mark the axis of propagation. (b) The normalized intensity
recorded at the CCD when SLM A (Alice) and SLM B (Bob)
select one of the three states from one of the 4 bases.
to 1/3 (1/d) and the elements corresponding to differ-
ent bases are found to be 1/9 (1/d2). This validates the
implementation of the filters (holograms) and their nor-
malization. Our approach in obtaining the normalized
joint probabilities is outlined in the Appendix.
Following the successful implementation of the P&M
scheme, we proceeded to the EB scheme. For each per-
mutation of the projective measurements by Alice and
Bob in the EB scheme, the single count rates and coinci-
dence count rates were recorded and the normalized joint
probabilities calculated for d = 2, 3, 4 and 5 are given in
Fig. 4. In studying the data in Fig. 4, it is evident that
when the filter settings are the same, anti-correlations in
all the bases are observed (denoted by the white diagonal
elements). In performing the projective measurements,
completely orthogonal filter settings result in no correla-
tions (an inconclusive measurement), while the overlap
between the remaining filter settings is given as the in-
verse of the dimension (i.e. 1/d).
Based on the results from the normalized joint proba-
bilities, we calculated the average error rate Q according
to Eq. (10). We find that for d = 2, 3, 4 and 5, the
average error rate, Q = 0.016, 0.040, 0.088, and 0.14,
respectively. By using these values of Q together with
Eq. (11) we calculate the secret key rate to be rmin =
0.7590, 1.123, 1.139 and 0.8606 for d = 2, 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. Figure 5 contains the measured secret key
rates plotted as a function of the measured average error
rates for dimensions d = 2, 3, 4 and 5, denoted by the
data points. The curves denote the theoretical secret key
rate as a function of the average error rate, plotted with
the use of Eq. (11). For each dimension, d, the intersec-
tion between the dashed curves and the horizontal axis
(i.e. where rmin = 0) corresponds to the maximum per-
missible error rate (Qmax) in order to enable the secure
distribution of a secret key. Ideally, we want to minimize
the error rate Q in order to maximize the secret key rate
rmin.
5FIG. 4. The normalized joint probabilities when SLM A (Al-
ice) and SLM B (Bob) select one of the d states from one of
the d+ 1 bases for the EB scheme.
FIG. 5. The secret key rate, rmin, as a function of the av-
erage error rate, Q, for different dimensions. The solid data
points denote the measured values and the dashed curves the
theoretical values calculated from Eq. (11).
The Shannon information for d = 2, 3, 4 and 5 is cal-
culated to be I(A:B) = 0.9999, 1.313, 1.478 and 1.487,
respectively (depicted by the green data points in Fig. 7),
while the Shannon mutual information increases mono-
tonically, it seems to level off for d = 4 and 5. On the
other hand rmin first increases and then decreases for d =
5. This means that we have reached a finite limit on the
dimension in which the protocol can encode, while still
resulting in higher generation rates per photon. The dif-
ference between these two quantities (I(A:B) and rmin) is
the mutual information between Alice and Eve, in other
words the information that is shared between Alice and
Eve (denoted by the red lines in Fig. 7). From our results
it is evident that the noise (attributed to a disturbance
by Eve) grows faster than the correlations between Alice
and Bob that can be used to generate a key. As this is not
expected theoretically, this may be due to the complexity
FIG. 6. The measured average error rate (Q) and the maxi-
mum permissible error rate (Qmax) evaluated when rmin = 0.
associated with encoding higher-dimensional states holo-
graphically on pixelated, finite resolution, spatial light
modulators. Our detection efficiency is low because our
filter measurements are based on intensity masking and
serve as a proof-of-principle experiment.
FIG. 7. The Shannon mutual information I(A:B) (green) and
the secret key rate rmin (blue) plotted as a function of the
dimension.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have realized a P&M and an EB QKD
protocol for d = 2 to 5 MUB measurements encoded in
the OAM degree of freedom. We show that our proto-
col which is based on filter measurements can be mapped
back into the original MUB protocol which uses full mea-
surements. In particular, we verify our claim that detec-
tion efficiency depends on a basis choice and not on the
element within a basis, an important consideration for
the protocol to work. We show this explicitly for d = 2
and attest to the fact that this dependency holds for all
dimensions. We infer from our measurements the average
error rate, mutual information and secret key generation
6rate per photon for each dimension. We observe that en-
coding in higher-dimensional MUBs, leads to an increase
in the encoding density per photon and increased key
generation rates per photon. This work is based upon
research supported by the South African Research Chair
Initiative of the Department of Science and Technology
and National Research Foundation. T. Konrad. acknowl-
edges the partial support from the National Research
Foundation of South Africa [Grant No. 86325 (UID)].
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Shannon information
In order to analyze the security of our scheme, we em-
ploy the concept of mutual information given by Shan-
non. The Shannon entropy gives a measure of uncer-
tainty for a random variable A with alphabet A and is
defined as H(A) = −∑a∈A p(a) log2 p(a), where p(a) is
the probability of outcome a. The classical mutual infor-
mation is defined as the amount by which the Shannon
entropy on A decreases when one learns about B. The
classical mutual information I(A : B), gives a degree of
correlation between Alice (A), and Bob’s (B) data and it
is also an upper bound on the secret key rate. It is defined
as I(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B), where H(A,B)
is the joint entropy. The joint entropy is used to measure
the total uncertainty about the pair (A,B). It is ex-
pressed as H(A,B) = −∑a∈A∑b∈B p(a, b) log2 p(a, b).
After data-processing, Alice and Bob apply a key map
where their respective data is mapped to raw keys K
and K ′. In this step, the total probability distribution
remains unchanged but the total classical mutual infor-
mation changes to I(A′ : B), which is expressed as
I(A′ : B) = H(A′) +H(B)−H(A′, B), (13)
where H(A′) =
∑
a
∑
ij p
aa
ij log2 p
aa
ij . The joint entropy
is defined in a similar manner as above.
B. Calculation of detection efficiencies
In this section, we show how to formalize and verify
the claim that the detection efficiencies depend only on
the bases but are the same for all elements within a basis.
We demonstrate the calculation of detection efficiencies
by comparing the expected and detected number of clicks
for the case of qubit pairs (d = 2). For this purpose, we
first calculate the expected number of detection events
by following the light beam from the laser source to the
detection device. Afterwords we relate them to the mea-
sured counts. By comparing the single count rates and
the coincidence count rates we obtain an expression for
the detection efficiency for each basis state.
1. Photon pair creation and action of the beam splitter
The state of the light exiting the laser source can be
represented by a coherent state with complex parameter
α which specifies the intensity and phase of the light:
|α〉 = D(α)|0〉 = exp(αb†0 − α∗b0)|0〉, (14)
where |0〉 is the vacuum state, b0 and b†0 are annihilation
and creation operators, respectively, with index referring
to OAM value l = 0. The operator D(α) is called a
displacement operator. The laser beam pumps a BBO
crystal, creating pairs of photons with OAM values ±l
by type I parametric down conversion. This process can
be modeled by the following transformation of creation
operators
b†0 →
∑
ℓ
√
χℓa
†
ℓa
†
−ℓ, (15)
where χℓ is the creation probability of a photon pair with
OAM values ±ℓ and a†±ℓ are the corresponding creation
operators. After passing through the BBO crystal the
light is sent to a 50 : 50 beam splitter resulting in the
transformation:
a†ℓ →
1√
2
(
a†ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,B
)
, (16)
where A and B refer to the two beams exiting the beam
splitter. Thus, the combined action of the BBO crystal
and the beam splitter reads
a†0 →
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
(
a†ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,B√
2
)(
a†−ℓ,A + a
†
−ℓ,B√
2
)
. (17)
It maps the displacement operator D(α) to a squeeze
operator S(α√χℓ) given by
S(α√χℓ) = exp
(
α
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
(
a†ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,B√
2
)
×
(
a†−ℓ,A + a
†
−ℓ,B√
2
)
− α∗
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
×
(
aℓ,A + aℓ,B√
2
)(
a−ℓ,A + a−ℓ,B√
2
))
. (18)
Thus, the initial coherent state is transformed into a
(two-mode) squeezed vacuum state: |α˜〉 = S(α√χℓ)|0〉.
7For small value of α
√
χℓ the state |α˜〉 can be approxi-
mated to the first order in α
√
χℓ as:
|α˜〉 ≈ N
[
1 + α
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
(
a†ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,B√
2
)
×
(
a†−ℓ,A + a
†
−ℓ,B√
2
)]
|0〉, (19)
where N is the normalization constant. The vacuum
does not play any role as far as photon detections are
concerned, thus, one can ignore the vacuum component.
This results in the (unnormalized) state |ψ〉 which reads:
|ψ〉 = α
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
(
a†ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,B√
2
)(
a†−ℓ,A + a
†
−ℓ,B√
2
)
|0〉,
(20)
=
α
2
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ(a
†
ℓ,Aa
†
−ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,Aa
†
−ℓ,B
+ a†ℓ,Ba
†
−ℓ,A + a
†
ℓ,Ba
†
−ℓ,B)|0〉, (21)
2. Measurements
After the BBO crystal and the beam spitter filter mea-
surements projecting onto individual basis modes were
carried out independently in both beams A and B. The
signal for each basis mode was detected by means of
avalanche photodiodes. These detectors respond to in-
cident photons, but do not discriminate between a single
photon and multiple photons. However, the probability
for a click varies for different photon numbers. The prob-
ability to obtain a click in a filter measurement of mode
s can be modeled by the expectation value of the effect
Ps defined by
Ps =
∞∑
n=1
η(n)s |ns〉〈ns|, (22)
where η
(n)
s represents the probability for n photons in
mode s to trigger a detector click and reads [32]
η(n)s = 1− (1− η(1)s )n,
≈ nη(1)s for small η(1)s . (23)
Because of photon loss on the path from source to detec-
tor and non-ideal detection, only a fraction of the detec-
tion events expected under ideal conditions is measured
in the experiment. We attribute any loss to non-ideal de-
tection. The probability of coincidence can be calculated
as an expectation value of the operator Ps ⊗ Ps′ with
respect to the state |ψ〉 (cp. Eq. (21)) after the beam
splitter.
Basis vectors Detector A Detector B
1 0.01504 0.02145
2 0.01517 0.02106
3 0.00536 0.00886
4 0.00503 0.00727
5 0.00508 0.00787
6 0.00556 0.00874
TABLE I. Detection efficiencies for different detectors pro-
jecting on different bases vectors. Here the first two vectors
belong to the σz basis, the following two to the σx basis, and
the last two to the σy basis.
From Eq. (21) it is clear that only the single photon
components of state |ψ〉 can yield a click of detector A
for OAM value ℓ, leading to a detection probability of
pℓ,A = 〈ψ|Pℓ ⊗ I|ψ〉 = η(1)ℓ,A|α|2χℓ/2 . (24)
Similarly, we can calculate the other probabilities as:
p−ℓ,A = 〈ψ|P−ℓ ⊗ I|ψ〉 = η(1)−ℓ,A|α|2χℓ/2 , (25)
pℓ,B = 〈ψ|I⊗ Pℓ|ψ〉 = η(1)ℓ,B|α|2χℓ/2 , (26)
p−ℓ,B = 〈ψ|I⊗ P−ℓ|ψ〉 = η(1)−ℓ,B|α|2χℓ/2 . (27)
The probability of the coincidence count in detector A
with OAM value ℓ and in detector B with OAM value
−ℓ amounts to
pℓ,A,−ℓ,B = 〈ψ|Pℓ ⊗ P−ℓ|ψ〉 = η(1)ℓ,Aη(1)−ℓ,B|α|2χℓ/4 . (28)
For the measured count of clicks Cℓ,A in detector A
with OAM value ℓ, and the measured count C−ℓ,B in de-
tector B with OAM value −ℓ we obtain the expressions:
Cℓ,A = Npℓ,A, (29)
C−ℓ,B = Np−ℓ,B, (30)
Cℓ,A,−ℓ,B = Npℓ,A,−ℓ,B, (31)
whereN is the number of photon pairs created by consec-
utive pump pulses during the measurement period. For
the coincidence counts Cℓ,A,−ℓ,B in the last equation it
is assumed that photon loss in beam A and beam B are
independent. Note that pℓ,A,−ℓ,B/pℓ,A = η
(1)
−ℓ,B/2 and
hence one can calculate the efficiencies as:
η
(1)
−ℓ,B = 2
Cℓ,A,−ℓ,B
Cℓ,A
, (32)
η
(1)
ℓ,A = 2
Cℓ,A,−ℓ,B
C−ℓ,B
. (33)
For the SLM-filter setting (|ℓ〉 ± | − ℓ〉)/√2 which is
a superposition of ±ℓ OAM modes, the corresponding
8creation operators read a†± ≡ (a†ℓ,A ± a†−ℓ,A)/
√
2. Thus,
we can represent a†ℓ,A and a
†
−ℓ,A in terms of a
†
± as:
a†±ℓ =
a†+,A ± a†−,A√
2
. (34)
Substituting Eq. (34) in Eq. (21) we obtain:
|ψ〉 = α
4
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ
(√
2
(a†+,A)
2
√
2
−
√
2
(a†−,A)
2
√
2
+2a†+,Aa
†
+,B − 2a†−,Ba†−,A
+
√
2
(a†+,B)
2
√
2
−
√
2
(a†−,B)
2
√
2
)
|0〉. (35)
Thus, the probability of a click in detector A for the
SLM setting + amounts to p+,A = η
(1)
+,A|α|2χℓ/2 while
the coincidence probability for the SLM setting + in
the detector A and the detector B reads p+,A,+,B =
η
(1)
+,Aη
(1)
+,B|α|2χℓ/4. The observed number of clicks are
related to the expected detection counts as:
C+,A = Np+,A, (36)
C+,B = Np+,B, (37)
C+,A,+,B = Np+,A,+,B, (38)
Since p+,A,+,B/p+,A = η
(1)
+,B/2, if follows for the efficien-
cies that:
η
(1)
+,B = 2
C+,A,+,B
C+,A
, (39)
η
(1)
+,A = 2
C+,A,+,B
C+,B
. (40)
Similarly for SLM settings (|ℓ〉± i|− ℓ〉)/√2 the state |ψ〉
can be rewritten as:
|ψ〉 = α
4
∞∑
ℓ=0
√
χℓ(
√
2
(a†+y,A)
2
√
2
+
√
2
(a†−y,A)
2
√
2
+ 2a†+y,Aa
†
+y,B + 2a
†
−y,Ba
†
−y,A
+
√
2
(a†+y,B)
2
√
2
+
√
2
(a†−y,B)
2
√
2
)|0〉, (41)
where
a†±y,A =
a†ℓ,A ± ia†−ℓ,A√
2
. (42)
Thus, the relation for the efficiencies in this filter setting
is obtained as:
η
(1)
+y,B = 2
C+y,A,+y,B
C+y,A
, (43)
η
(1)
+y,A = 2
C+y,A,+y,B
C+y,B
. (44)
Using the expressions derived above, we calculated the
detection efficiencies for the case of a two-level system
for different SLM settings (cp. Table I). We found that
even though the detection efficiencies vary for different
bases, the fluctuation in the values is very small for all
the basis vectors within each basis which proves the claim
for qubits.
Furthermore, this method can be used to show that the
detection efficiencies are independent of the basis vectors
within each basis, regardless of the dimension. However,
let us point out that the analysis of our measurement
data indicated an anomaly for the detection efficiency
for the OAM value ℓ = 0, which is different from the
other values of OAM. Although not so important in the
present context, this case has to be investigated more
carefully when it comes to actual key transmission and
will be the subject of future work.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J.
Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[3] C. Bennett, G. Brassard, et al., in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems and
Signal Processing, Vol. 175 (Bangalore, India, 1984).
[4] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[5] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
[6] V. Scarani, A. Ac´ın, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[7] A. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[8] J. Schwinger, Proceedings of the national academy of sci-
ences of the United States Of America 46, 570 (1960).
[9] I. Ivonovic, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Gen-
eral 14, 3241 (1981).
[10] W. Wootters and B. Fields, Annuals of Physics 191, 363
(1989).
[11] R. B. A. Adamson and A. M. Steinberg,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 030406 (2010).
[12] A. Ferna´ndez-Pe´rez, A. B. Klimov, and C. Saavedra,
Phys. Rev. A 83, 052332 (2011).
[13] D. Giovannini, J. Romero, J. Leach, A. Dudley,
A. Forbes, and M. J. Padgett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 110,
143601 (2013).
[14] A. Calderbank, E. Rains, P. Shor, and N. Sloane, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 78, 405 (1997).
[15] D. Gottesman, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1862 (1996).
[16] S. M. Barnett, Quantum Information (Oxford University
Press, 2009).
[17] T. Durt, B.-G. Englert, I. Bengtsson, and K. Zyczkowski,
International Journal of Quantum Information 08, 535
(2010).
9[18] L. Sheridan and V. Scarani,
Phys. Rev. A 82, 030301 (2010).
[19] A. Ferenczi and N. Lu¨tkenhaus,
Phys. Rev. A 85, 052310 (2012).
[20] L. Allen, M. Beijersbergen, R. Spreeuw, and J. Woerd-
man, Phys. Rev. A 45, 8185 (1992).
[21] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett.
85, 3313 (2000).
[22] S. Gro¨blacher, T. Jennewein, A. Vaziri, G. Weihs, and
A. Zeilinger, New Journal of Physics 8, 75 (2006).
[23] I.-C. Yu, F.-L. Lin, and C.-Y. Huang,
Phys. Rev. A 78, 012344 (2008).
[24] N. J. Cerf, M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, and N. Gisin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 127902 (2002).
[25] B. Rodenburg, M. J. P. Lavery, M. Malik, M. N.
O’Sullivan, M. Mirhosseini, D. J. Robertson, M. J. Pad-
gett, and R. W. Boyd, Opt. Lett. 37, 3735 (2012).
[26] H. Lo, H. Chau, and M. Ardehali, Journal of Cryptology
18, 133 (2005).
[27] M. T. Gruneisen, W. A. Miller, R. C. Dymale, and A. M.
Sweiti, Applied Optics 47, A32 (2008).
[28] V. Arrizo´n, U. Ruiz, R. Carrada, and A. Gonza´lez, J.
Opt. Soc. Am. A 24, 3500 (2007).
[29] J. A. Davies, D. M. Cottrell, J. Campos, M. J. Yzuel,
and I. Moreno, Applied Optics 38, 5004 (1999).
[30] G. Lima, L. Neves, R. Guzma´n, E. S. Go´mez, W. A. T.
Nogueira, A. Delgado, A. Vargas, and S. C., Opt. Ex-
press 19, 3542 (2011).
[31] D. Klyshko, Soviet Physics Uspekhi 31, 74 (1988).
[32] T. Jennewein, M. Barbieri, and A. G. White, J. Mod.
Phys. 58, 276 (2011).
